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Abstract
Though deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown superiority over other techniques in
major fields like computer vision, natural language processing, robotics, recently, it has
been proven that they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. The addition of a simple, small
and almost invisible perturbation to the original input image can be used to fool DNNs into
making wrong decisions. With more attack algorithms being designed, a need for defending
the neural networks from such attacks arises. Retraining the network with adversarial
images is one of the simplest techniques. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of
such a retraining strategy in defending against adversarial attacks. We also show how
simple algorithms like KNN can be used to determine the labels of the adversarial images
needed for retraining. We present the results on two standard datasets namely, CIFAR-10
and TinyImageNet.
Keywords: Adversarial Image, Retraining, Defense, White-Box, Black-Box, Perturbation,
Adversarial Attack
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks have shown excellence in many tasks like image classification, image
segmentation, image reconstruction etc. Though they have outperformed humans in some
of these tasks, they are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. A simple change in the
input image can change the output of the network drastically, which is highly undesirable.
There are several ways to categorize the adversarial attacks. First, they can be classified
as targeted attacks and non-targeted attacks. In a targeted attack, the goal is to misguide
the network to a specific targeted class label different than the true label. On the other hand,
in a non-targeted attack, the goal is to force the network to predict any label different than
the original label. The targeted attacks are more difficult to design than the non-targeted
ones, as the attack is considered successful only when the network predicts the specified
category.
The adversarial attacks can also be divided as a white-box attack or black-box attack,
depending on the extent of access the attacker has to the architecture of the targeted net-
work. In white-box attack, the attacker has access to the entire architecture of the targeted
network. This makes the design of such attacks simpler than the black-box attacks because
the architecture of the target network is completely unknown to the black-box attackers.
Having full access to the architecture of the targeted network is a strong assumption which
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may be unrealistic in many real-world applications and thus black-box attacks have drawn
more attention recently. Apart from the attacks, the perturbations added to the input image
are of two types - universal perturbations and image-dependent perturbations. Universal
perturbations are fixed patterns which can be added to any clean image in order to generate
adversarial images. On the contrary, image-dependent perturbations vary from image to
image.
Neural networks are being used in applications like surveillance and user authentication,
where misclassification due to adversarial attacks can pose major security threats. In appli-
cations like autonomous driving (Sermanet and LeCun (2011)), misclassification can lead
to fatal accidents. Therefore, defending the neural networks against adversarial attacks is
important. A basic way to defend against the adversarial attacks is to retrain the network
with adversarial examples (Szegedy et al. (2013)). In this paper, we present an analysis
of how retraining the network with adversarial images can be an effective defense against
the adversarial attacks. We also show how simple machine learning algorithms may be
used to determine the labels of the adversarial images, which are necessary for retraining.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 includes important related work.
Section 3 explains the retraining strategy and representative attackers. Section 4 includes
our experiments and Section 5 concludes.
2. Related Work
In this section, we present a brief survey of the recent work related to adversarial attacks
and the defenses. The phenomenon that the network gets fooled by a small change in input
image was initially studied by Szegedy et al. (2013). The added perturbations are so small
that the images are recognizable by the human eye but the network fails to categorize it
correctly.
Nguyen et al. (2015) showed that it takes little effort to generate random noise images
for which the network predicts a label with extremely high confidence. The images look like
noise to the human eye but the network assigns them a class label with as high confidence
as 99%. The robustness of the adversarial images is demonstrated in Athalye et al. (2017).
They proposed a new method called Expectation over Transformation to generate adversar-
ial images which are highly robust to different transformations like re-scaling, rotation, the
addition of Gaussian Noise, lightening or darkening by an additive factor. Eykholt et al.
(2018) presents an adversarial attack known as Robust Physical Perturbation (RP2) that
can create perturbations under physical conditions.
When it comes to defenses against these attacks, retraining the network with the ad-
versarial images was discussed in Szegedy et al. (2013). The generated adversarial images
were used for training the network. The error rate on such images was seen to decrease
drastically after retraining the network. It states that retraining is different from data
augmentation techniques since such type of data does not occur frequently in the test set.
Papernot et al. (2016) introduced another defense strategy known as defensive distillation to
defend adversarial images. It is based on the distillation mechanism which was introduced
in Hinton et al. (2015) to reduce the computational complexity of the large neural network
architectures.
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3. Defending Attacks via a Simple Retraining Strategy
Given a classifier trained on some original training set of images, retraining is the process
of training the classifier again with adversarial images added to the original training set
in order to increase its robustness. Generally speaking, adversarial images do not come
with labels that can be directly used for retraining. As an adversarial image typically looks
similar to certain original image, the “true” label of this adversarial image should be the
label of that original image (although by definition of “attacking”, the classifier may not
be able to predict that label). When the adversarial images do not look like any original
images but more like random noise, they are known as fooling images. In such cases, it is
not proper to assign any original label to them, and one way is to put all the fooling images
in one new class (or possibly multiple n new classes depending on some clustering analysis
of the images). Therefore, there may be an addition of new class labels while retraining
with fooling images.
3.1. Producing True Labels for the Adversarial Images
Attacking algorithms often start from an authentic image (of the certain label) to produce
an adversarial or fooling image. Hence, in theory, the original label may be used as the true
label of the generated image. However, having access to the attacker in order to determine
the true labels is not always possible. Also, it has been demonstrated that adversarial
images are transferable. This means that the adversarial images can fool several neural
networks of different architecture simultaneously. Therefore, it may be problematic to rely
on a single neural network to attempt to predict the true label of an adversarial image.
Figure 1: A general framework for the simple retraining strategy. The true label generator
determines the labels of adversarial and fooling images using network-independent
techniques like KNN. The images with their true labels are then used for retraining
the network.
For the above considerations, we should resort to some universal technique not specific to
any particular network. In this study, we employ the K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) algorithm
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for this purpose. Most of the adversarial attacks have a constraint of maintaining a minimum
L2 distance between a generated adversarial image and an original image to make them look
similar to each other. Due to this constraint, the KNN algorithm can be used as a simple
strategy for finding out the true labels of the adversarial images. For fooling images, the
L2 distance between them and original images is very large. Hence while using the KNN
algorithm for fooling images, we may create one additional class if the distance becomes
too large (alternatively, multiple new classes may be created to accommodate clusters of
the fooling images).
When the number of dimensions is high, KNN takes a longer time to run. Higher
the dimensions, longer is the running time and higher is the accuracy. In order to reduce
dimensions to lessen the running time, PCA (Principal Component Analysis) may be used.
The number of reduced dimensions need to be chosen such that high accuracy is achieved
in a reasonable amount of time. Figure 1 shows the complete framework for the retraining
strategy with adversarial and/or fooling images.
3.2. Choosing the Representative Attackers
We selected four adversarial attacks to evaluate the effect of retraining as a defense strategy
which are briefly discussed here. There are two main reasons for choosing these attacks.
First, they produce strong adversarial images that lead to high initial fooling ratio. All of
these recent attacks have different working principles. For instance, Generative Adversarial
Perturbations attack makes use of a neural network to create the perturbations, FGSM is
gradient-based, DeepFool attack is about linearizing the classifier to generate perturbations
and Carlini-Wagner attack is optimization-based. Hence, these approaches represent a wide
range of possibilities that may be employed by an attacker.
3.2.1. Generative Adversarial Perturbations (GAP)
The framework used for generating the universal perturbations in this technique (Poursaeed
et al. (2018)) is shown in Figure 2. A neural network fθ(.) is used in order to approximate
the function that can generate the perturbations for converting the original images into
adversarial ones. Here, fθ(.) is a ResNet, which is generally used for transforming images
from one domain to another.
To generate the universal perturbations, a fixed pattern drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion randomly is passed to the generator as input. The output, again a fixed pattern, is then
scaled to the range on which the network is trained. This is the final universal perturbation
which can be added to any natural image from the dataset to make it an adversarial image.
For the rest of the paper, we refer this method as GAP attack.
3.2.2. DeepFool
DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016)) is a non-targeted, white box attack which is
based on iterative linearization of the target classifier. It produces minimum perturbations,
imperceptible to the human eye, just enough to change the prediction of the classifier. It
is assumed that the neural networks are completely linear and the hyperplanes separate
the classes from one another. Using this assumption, a greedy approach and existing op-
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Figure 2: The framework for generating universal perturbations. The ResNet receives a
noisy pattern as input and produces a universal perturbation pattern. This can
be added to an input image to convert it to an adversarial image, which is then
fed to the network as input.
timization techniques, the minimally perturbed image is found. It uses the L2 distance
metric.
The minimum perturbations reduce the complexity and the time taken to generate the
adversarial images. Therefore, it is a highly efficient method and produces closer adversarial
examples.
3.2.3. Carlini-Wagner Attack
This is an optimization-based (Carlini and Wagner (2017)), white-box attack that uses the
perturbation norm in order to design the cost function used for producing the adversarial
images. Similar to L-BFGS method (Szegedy et al. (2013)), this algorithm makes use of
box constraints while defining the cost function. The Carlini-Wagner algorithm covers three
different attack algorithms based on L0, L1 and L2 distance metric. These attacks have a
success rate of almost 100%. The L2 attack is the strongest one among all the three attacks.
The invisible perturbations in the adversarial images and high success rate of fooling
make it a very strong adversarial attack. However, the algorithm has high computational
cost and time complexity for adversarial image generation.
3.2.4. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al. (2014)) is one of the initial adver-
sarial attacks. It makes use of the gradients of the network in order to produce perturbed
images which are misclassified by the network. It is a non-targeted, white box attack. If
θ is the parameters of the neural network, x and y are the input and corresponding target
respectively, then the adversarial image x∗ is calculated using Equation (1). Figure 3 shows
how the perturbations added to the original image are invisible to the human eye.
x∗ = x+ sign (∇xJ (θ, x, y)) (1)
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Figure 3: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). The final adversarial image is generated by
adding the perturbation calculated using FGSM method to the original image
from the TinyImageNet dataset.
4. Experiments and Results
In this section, our experiments conducted on CIFAR-10 and TinyImageNet dataset for eval-
uation of retraining strategy as a defense against adversarial attacks are included. CIFAR-10
dataset (Krizhevsky et al. (2014)) contains 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images
of size 32x32. TinyImageNet dataset is the smaller version of ImageNet dataset (Deng
et al. (2009)) containing 200 classes. Each class of the dataset contains 500 training im-
ages, 50 test images and 50 validation images of size 64x64. We use the validation data of
TinyImageNet for our experiments.
For CIFAR-10 dataset, VGG16 (Simonyan and Zisserman (2014)) network with a test
accuracy of 92.37% is used as the target classifier. In the case of TinyImageNet dataset,
a ResNet (He et al. (2016)) classifier is used which achieves an accuracy of 72.42% on the
validation data.
4.1. Black-Box Attacks
4.1.1. Generative Adversarial Perturbations
We consider non-targeted attacks using ResNetGenerator for generating universal pertur-
bations. The perturbations are controlled by L-infinity which is 10 for both the datasets.
For CIFAR-10 dataset, the ResNetGenerator is trained with a learning rate of 0.002.
The initial fooling ratio is 82% without affecting the test accuracy on original images. Fig-
ure 4 shows some original images and the adversarial images generated by adding universal
perturbations to them. It is evident that though the images look similar to original images,
the perturbations are visible to the human eye. Next, the classifier is trained with different
number of adversarial images added to the original training dataset. Table 1 shows the
results of retraining the classifier and the fooling ratio after it.
The accuracy on the adversarial images from the Table 1 shows that the network can
learn the adversarial images very well. After retraining, the fooling ratio drops significantly.
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Figure 4: Original images and adversarial images generated using the GAP attack for
CIFAR-10 Dataset. Images on the left are the original images and the corre-
sponding adversarial images are displayed on the right. The added perturbations
are clearly visible.
Adversarial
Images used
for Retraining
Accuracy
on Original
Images
Accuracy on
Adversarial
Images
Fooling Ratio
after Retraining
50,000 92.25% 91.09% 13%
25,000 92.4% 90.18% 16%
12,500 91.5% 88.5% 24%
9,000 90.52% 86.64% 26%
Table 1: Retraining the CIFAR-10 classifier with adversarial images generated using the
GAP attack. The number of original training images is 50,000 which remains
constant and the number of adversarial images used for training is varied.
Even if the number of adversarial images is decreased to almost (1/6)th of the total training
data, the network learns them very well and can no longer be fooled.
For TinyImageNet, the ResNetGenerator is trained with a learning rate of 0.001. The
initial fooling ratio is 92%. As the accuracy of the classifier on the validation data is not
very high, it is easier to fool the network. Therefore, the fooling ratio is higher than the
accuracy of the network. Figure 5 shows the original images and the generated adversarial
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images for TinyImageNet dataset. Table 2 shows the results of retraining the TinyImageNet
classifier and re-attacking it.
Figure 5: Original images and adversarial images generated using the GAP Attack for Tiny-
ImageNet dataset. Images on the left are the original images and the correspond-
ing adversarial images are displayed on the right.
Adversarial
Images used
for Retraining
Accuracy
on Original
Images
Accuracy on
Adversarial
Images
Fooling Ratio
after Retraining
100,000 72.4% 66% 22%
75,000 72% 66% 23%
50,000 72.1% 66% 22%
25,000 72% 65% 24%
Table 2: Retraining the TinyImageNet classifier with different number of adversarial im-
ages generated using the GAP Attack. The number of original training images
is 100,000 which remains constant and the number of adversarial images used for
training is varied.
The results are similar to the results of CIFAR-10 dataset. The accuracy on the ad-
versarial images is as high as the test accuracy on original images. Furthermore, it can
recognize such adversarial data after retraining indicated by low fooling ratio. This trend
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is observed even when only 25,000 adversarial images are used for retraining. For Tiny-
ImageNet, even (1/4)th of the total data is sufficient for the network to be robust to such
adversarial images. Therefore, the adversarial images generated using GAP attack are not
very strong as they can be easily defended by retraining the classifier with a small number
of adversarial images.
4.2. White-Box Attacks
4.2.1. DeepFool
For CIFAR-10 dataset, this non-targeted attack has an initial fooling ratio of 99%. After
adding 50,000 adversarial images to original training data and 10,000 adversarial images to
original test data, the test accuracy on adversarial images is 90.13%. When this retrained
classifier is attacked again using DeepFool algorithm, the fooling ratio is 99% again.
Figure 6: Original images and adversarial images generated using DeepFool algorithm for
CIFAR-10 Dataset. Images on the left are the original images and the corre-
sponding adversarial images are displayed on the right.
For TinyImageNet dataset too, the initial fooling ratio is 99%. After using the same
number of adversarial images as the original images in training and test set, the classifier
achieved a test accuracy of 71% on the adversarial images and 72.42% on the original
images. Attacking this retrained classifier, a fooling ratio of 99% was achieved. The results
are summarized in Table 3.
The adversarial images along with their corresponding original images for CIFAR-10
and TinyImageNet dataset are displayed in Figure 6 and Figure 7 respectively. It can be
seen that the perturbations added to most of the images are imperceptible to the human
eye. For both the datasets, the high fooling ratio even after the retraining the classifier
indicates that the retraining strategy did not work as a defense in case of DeepFool attack.
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Figure 7: Original and adversarial images generated using DeepFool algorithm for TinyIm-
ageNet Dataset. Images on the left are the original images and the corresponding
adversarial images are displayed on the right.
Dataset Test Accuracy on
Original Images
Test Accuracy on
Adversarial Images
Fooling Ratio
after Retraining
CIFAR-10 92.02% 90.13% 99%
TinyImageNet 72.42% 71% 99%
Table 3: Retraining the classifiers with the adversarial images generated using DeepFool
algorithm for CIFAR-10 and TinyImageNet Dataset. The number of adversarial
images used for retraining is the same as the number of original training images.
The reason it is successful even after retraining is because it has access to the gradients of
the retrained classifier, which are used for crafting the new adversarial examples.
4.2.2. Carlini-Wagner Attack
We use the L2 attack for our experiments because it is considered to be the strongest among
the three attacks. For both the datasets, the target label is the label of the least likely class.
For CIFAR-10 dataset, the initial fooling ratio is 100%. Using the entire original data along
with 50,000 adversarial images for training and 10,000 adversarial test images, test accuracy
of 90.8% is achieved on the adversarial images. Therefore, the network has learnt the images
very well. After attacking the retrained classifier, the fooling ratio continues to be 99%.
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Therefore, the network can be successfully fooled even after learning the adversarial images
properly.
Figure 8: Original images and adversarial images generated using the Carlini-Wagner algo-
rithm for CIFAR-10 Dataset. Images on the left are the original images and the
corresponding adversarial images are displayed on the right.
Similarly, the initial fooling ratio is 99% for TinyImageNet dataset. The same number
of adversarial images as the original training images are used for retraining the network.
The test accuracy of the network on these adversarial images is 71.3% which is very close
to the test accuracy of 72.42% on original images. Now, the retrained network is attacked
again and the fooling ratio remains the same as the initial one. The reason why it succeeds
in fooling even after retraining is the same as DeepFool attack - it has access to the new
gradients of the retrained network which are used for creating new adversarial images. The
results for both the datasets are summarized in Table 4.
Dataset Test Accuracy on
Original Images
Test Accuracy on
Adversarial Images
Fooling Ratio
after Retraining
CIFAR-10 92.37% 90.80% 99%
TinyImageNet 72.11% 70% 99%
Table 4: Retraining the network using the adversarial images generated using Carlini-
Wagner algorithm for CIFAR-10 and TinyImageNet Dataset. The number of ad-
versarial images used for retraining is the same as the number of original training
images.
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Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the original and adversarial images for CIFAR-10 and
TinyImageNet dataset respectively. The difference between the original and adversarial
images cannot be stated by merely looking at the images. Therefore, the perturbations
added are invisible to the human eye.
Figure 9: Original images and adversarial images generated using Carlini-Wagner algorithm
for TinyImageNet Dataset. Images on the left are the original images and the
corresponding adversarial images are displayed on the right.
4.2.3. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
For both the datasets, we use  = 0.07. For CIFAR-10 dataset, the initial fooling ratio
is 92.82%. For retraining the classifier, different number of adversarial images were used.
Table 5 summarizes these results.
For TinyImageNet dataset, the initial fooling ratio is 98%. The results for the retraining
of the classifier with different number of adversarial images for TinyImageNet dataset are
listed in Table 6.
Figure 10 and Figure 11 display the original and adversarial images generated using
FGSM for CIFAR-10 and TinyImageNet dataset respectively. While the perturbations are
visible in the CIFAR-10 images, there are completely invisible in TinyImageNet images.
This is because the size of CIFAR-10 images is very small and therefore even a small change
is clearly visible.
From the results for CIFAR-10 and TinyImageNet dataset, it is clear that the network
can learn the adversarial images accurately. Even though the number of adversarial images
used for training decreases, the test accuracy on the adversarial images is almost as high
as the test accuracy on original images. The FGSM is a white-box attack, but, the fooling
ratio after retraining reduces to more than half of the initial one because it is too simple.
It only adds + or − to the original image to make convert it to an adversarial one.
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Adversarial
Images used
for Retraining
Accuracy
on Original
Images
Accuracy on
Adversarial
Images
Fooling Ratio
after Retraining
50,000 92.45% 90.24% 44.72%
25,000 92.54% 90.3% 43.95%
12,500 92.78% 88.5% 46.72%
9,000 92.57% 86.1% 47.8%
Table 5: Retraining the CIFAR-10 classifier with adversarial images generated using the
FGSM algorithm. The number of original training images of 50,000 remains con-
stant and the number of adversarial images used for training is varied.
Adversarial
Images used
for Retraining
Accuracy
on Original
Images
Accuracy on
Adversarial
Images
Fooling Ratio
after Retraining
100,000 72.3% 69.2% 48.13%
75,000 72.42% 69% 48.9%
50,000 72.41% 68.1% 49.2%
25,000 72% 67.1% 49%
Table 6: Retraining the TinyImageNet classifier using the original 100,000 training images
and different number of adversarial images generated using the FGSM algorithm.
However, the fooling ratio after retraining is not as low as the GAP attack because the new
gradients of the retrained classifier are available to it which are used for generating new
adversarial images. These new adversarial images can fool the retrained network to some
extent indicated by a fooling ratio of approximately 45%-49%.
4.3. Producing the True Labels of the Adversarial Images
We employ the use of the KNN algorithm to find the true labels of adversarial images
generated using GAP attack. Keeping the minimum L2 distance constraint on original and
adversarial images in mind, we use K=1 for both CIFAR-10 and TinyImageNet dataset.
For our experiments, the dimensions are reduced to 300 for CIFAR-10 dataset and 2000
for TinyImageNet dataset. The numbers are chosen such that the balance between the
running time and the test accuracy is maintained. The accuracy of determining the labels
of adversarial images is as high as 98% on both the dataset which indicates that the labels
are determined accurately. Table 7 shows the results of these experiments. Such a high
accuracy means the predicted labels for adversarial images are almost the same as their true
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Figure 10: Original and adversarial images generated using the FGSM algorithm for
CIFAR-10 dataset. Images on the left are the original images and the corre-
sponding adversarial images are displayed on the right.
labels. Therefore, KNN can be used for finding the true labels of the adversarial images
accurately.
Dataset Original
Dimensions
Reduced Dimen-
sions using PCA
Test Accuracy
on the Labels
CIFAR-10 3072 300 98.29%
TinyImageNet 12288 2000 98%
Table 7: Producing the true labels of the adversarial images generated using GAP attack
for CIFAR-10 and TinyImageNet Dataset using KNN algorithm with K=1.
5. Conclusion
From this study, we derive a conclusion that the white-box attacks are robust to the re-
training defense strategy while the black-box attacks are not. The white-box attacks like
DeepFool and Carlini-Wagner can attack successfully after retraining because they have
access to the new gradients of the retrained network. FGSM, despite being a white-box at-
tack, fails to attack the retrained network with the initial fooling ratio because it is highly
simple. On the other hand, the black-box attacks cannot succeed in fooling the retrained
network. As having continuous access to the architecture and gradients of the network is
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Figure 11: Original and adversarial images generated using FGSM algorithm for TinyIma-
geNet Dataset. Images on the left are the original images and the corresponding
adversarial images are displayed on the right.
a very strong assumption, we conclude that the neural networks can be easily defended
against the adversarial attacks using retraining strategy.
Having access to the attack algorithm to get the true labels of adversarial images is
a strong assumption. Instead of relying on the attacker for the true labels of adversarial
images, we employed K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN), a simple machine learning algorithm
which is not specific to any particular classifier, to determine the true labels accurately.
This eliminated the need for access to the attack algorithms to get the true labels of the
adversarial images necessary for retraining.
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